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INTRODUCTION 
The question on the floor, I take it, is whether in drafting the Third 
Conflicts Restatement special considerations (or perhaps even rules) should 
come into play in tort and contract conflicts cases in which the involved 
jurisdictions are not all states of the United States. This is a question that—
in my view—admits of no easy answer. One might think that the question 
should be easier to answer in the seemingly benign fields of tort and contract, 
which are the subjects of this essay. Both tort and contract concepts under 
the common law have reasonably direct analogs in virtually every legal 
system.1 They do not involve complex and distinctively American statutory 
regimes such as the Securities Exchange Act or the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, both of which the U.S. Supreme Court has 
construed in implausibly narrow fashions to limit their impact abroad.2 
Copyright © Patrick J. Borchers 
* Lillis Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.
1. Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and Contract—Opening a New Frontier?, 21 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 467, 467 (1988). 
2. See generally RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
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But it is a mistake to assume that the questions get any easier just 
because the underlying concepts are familiar to most legal systems. 
American tort law, with generally larger awards for the injured party, has 
been described as the light to which the “moth” of foreign plaintiffs is 
drawn.3 While essentially every legal system agrees that a legal mechanism 
is necessary to enforce freely negotiated contracts that do not require the 
performance of an illegal act, these same systems divide sharply as to the 
extent to which parties perceived to be weaker—insurance policyholders, 
consumers and employees being among the most prominent4—should be 
protected.5 The United States effort at importing a mild consumer preference 
(borrowed from the European Union’s Rome I Regulation6) into the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s choice-of-law provisions was a flop; every U.S. 
jurisdiction except the Virgin Islands rejected it in favor of the pre-existing 
“substance blind” section.7 As a result, the American Law Institute and the 
National Commission on Uniform State Laws were forced to withdraw it.8 
It is easy to forget that the U.S. case igniting the flame of the American 
conflicts revolution, Babcock v. Jackson,9 was an international one. The 
conflict, which arose in a case involving a one-car auto accident in Ontario 
between parties who were all New Yorkers, was between Ontario’s guest 
statute, which completely barred recovery, and New York’s rule of ordinary 
care.10 Other well-known New York cases involved conflicts with Ontario 
law.11 In Neumeier v. Kuehner,12 New York’s high court attempted to draft 
soft rules for dealing with guest statute cases and in Edwards v. Erie Coach 
Lines Company,13 the Neumeier framework was applied to a conflict with an 
Ontario damage cap. 
However, these cases did not (expressly, anyway) view the international 
aspect as creating a novel problem, and the New York courts have since cited 
Ontario conflict cases interchangeably with domestic ones.14 Of course, as 
 
 3.  Smith, Kline & French Lab, Ltd. & SmithKline Corp. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 WLR 730, 733 (C.A.) 
(Eng.) (“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.”). 
 4.  See Council Regulation 593/2008, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See Patrick J. Borchers, An Essay on Predictability in Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Implications 
for a Third Conflicts Restatement, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 495, 502 (2015). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
 10.  Id. at 280. 
 11.  See, e.g., Macey v. Rozbicki, 221 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 1966). 
 12.  See generally 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972). 
 13.  952 N.E.2d 1033, 1037–44 (N.Y. 2011). 
 14.  See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685 (N.Y. 1985). 
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“international” goes, conflicts between New York law and the law of its 
English-speaking, common law neighbor to the north are about as tame as it 
gets. But as my Canadian-born wife reminds me, Canada is not part of the 
United States. 
Before getting to the choice-of-law portions of the draft Third 
Restatement, we need to address the elephant in the room: forum choice in 
tort and conflict matters. Unfortunately, in my view, the situation is a disaster 
in both areas, albeit for different reasons. It is equally unfortunate that the 
Third Restatement is ill-suited to remedy these problems because they are 
determined either by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
or a combination of the Constitution and a highly aggressive reading of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which is unlikely to be amended and preempts state 
law.15 The applicable law has become secondary to the question of whether 
there is a rational forum in which to apply it. 
I. FORUM CHOICE 
A. Torts 
1. Stream of Commerce Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction in the United States in tort cases is an unholy mess. 
The deterioration began with the U.S. Supreme Court’s dubious and 
arguably unnecessary opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,16 and devolved into near incomprehensibility in J. McIntyre Co. 
v. Nicastro17 and Walden v. Fiore.18 Compounding the problem has been the 
Supreme Court’s campaign to roll back corporate general jurisdiction—that 
is, jurisdiction based on a high volume of contacts unrelated to the dispute—
to the corporation’s state of incorporation and its principal place of 
business.19 While the constriction of general jurisdiction is more defensible 
on grounds that it prevents plaintiffs from “forum shopping” for favorable 
jurisdictions with little or no relation to the dispute, it has lost its role as a 
safety valve to provide a rational forum in cases in which it could not be 
justified otherwise.20 
 
 15.  See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; see also generally Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 16.  444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 17.  564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 18.  134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
 19.  See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 20.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.9 (citing Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem With General 
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect safety valve 
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The trouble, as I noted above, began with World-Wide. In that case, 
New Yorkers moving to Arizona were struck from behind by another driver 
while passing through Oklahoma, causing the New Yorkers’ Audi vehicle to 
burst into flames.21 The New Yorkers sued four defendants: the vehicle 
manufacturer (Audi), its importer (VWAG), the northeast distributor of the 
vehicle (World-Wide Volkswagen) and the New York dealer (Seaway).22 
The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the latter two 
defendants should be subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma state 
court. 
Only Justice Blackmun in his dissent asked the relevant question, which 
was essentially “who cares?”23  In a bygone era of joint and several liability 
and full indemnity among joint tortfeasors, having deep-pocketed defendants 
such as Audi should have made the question of whether defendants like 
World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway were joined irrelevant to the 
plaintiffs.24 
Had the U.S. Supreme Court countenanced the real issue it probably 
would have denied certiorari. The Robinsons (the plaintiffs) were still New 
York domiciliaries. Seaway and World-Wide were New York 
corporations.25  At the time, the dismissal of the New York-based defendants 
arguably would have allowed the remaining defendants to remove the case 
from state to federal court, and the defendants succeeded in doing so.26 
The successful removal to federal court changed the dynamics of the 
case. In state court, the venue would have been Creek County, Oklahoma, a 
forum highly favorable to plaintiffs.27 Instead, the case wound up in an 
Oklahoma federal court, with a jury pool much less favorable to the 
plaintiffs.28 In the end, the Robinsons recovered nothing.29 
The consequential aspects of World-Wide revolve less around its facts 
and more its dictum regarding so-called “stream of commerce” jurisdiction 
 
that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would 
deny it.”). 
 21.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 317–18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 24.  See generally Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen — the Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. 
REV. 1122 (1993). 
 25.  Id. at 1139. 
 26.  Id. at 1143. This would not be possible today as diversity-based removal from state to federal 
court cannot take place if the case has been filed in state court for more than a year. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
 27.  Adams, supra note 24, at 1128. 
 28.  Id. at 1127. 
 29.  Id. at 1146. 
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and its citation to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,30 
a famous Illinois state court decision allowing jurisdiction based upon the 
predictable sale of a product in the forum state.31 The implication was that if 
a product were predictably sold in the forum state (as opposed to being 
merely used there) the seller was subject to jurisdiction.32 But even so, the 
notion that the seller of a product, which is valuable specifically because of 
its mobility, should be able to avert its gaze to the possibility it might be used 
out of state is laughable. 
If a further mess were possible, it came in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court.33 Asahi resembled the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Gray, to which the World-Wide Court seemed to offer a nod of approval.34 
Asahi, like Gray, involved an injured party suing at home, and a defendant 
component part manufacturer involved in the production of the product, 
ultimately sold to the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s home state where it injured 
the plaintiff.35 In Asahi the component was a valve incorporated into a 
motorcycle tire,36 while in Gray it was a valve incorporated into a hot water 
heater.37 
There were additional differences between Asahi and Gray. In Asahi 
the manufacturer of both the component and the finished product were 
foreign,38 while in Gray, both parties were domestic.39 In Asahi the 
component manufacturer was only brought into the case as a third party on 
a contribution and indemnity claim by the manufacturer and was never sued 
by the injured party.40 In Gray, both manufacturers were named as 
defendants.41 
But on the question of whether the component had entered the state in 
the “stream of commerce,” the two cases were indistinguishable. In both 
cases, the product found its way into the hands of the consumer as the result 
of a predictable resale in the forum state and thus an effort by the 
 
 30.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)). 
 31.  Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766. 
 32.  See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 
85, 126 n.151 (1983). 
 33.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 34.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (citing Gray, 176 N.E. 2d at 761). 
 35.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105–06. 
 36.  Id. at 106. 
 37.  Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762.  
 38.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
 39.  Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764 (referring to the Ohio manufacture of the valve). 
 40.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
 41.  Gray, 176 N.E. 2d at 761. 
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manufacturer to take advantage of the forum state’s market. It is true that in 
Asahi California accounted for only about one percent of the market for its 
valves, but as Justice Stevens pointed out, that accounted for roughly 
100,000 valves—hardly a trivial number.42 
Despite the unanimous result, the Asahi Court split four to four on the 
appropriate definition of “stream of commerce.” Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion held that mere resale of the product in the forum was not 
enough to satisfy the stream-of-commerce test; the product’s market contact 
must be accompanied by other indicia of an effort to serve the market, such 
as customer support or a special design of the product for that market.43 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence took a competing view that predictable resale 
of products in the forum should suffice to satisfy the stream-of-commerce 
test, leaning heavily on World-Wide’s citation of Gray.44 Justice Stevens 
would not commit to either test, but opined that Justice O’Connor had 
misapplied her own standard; in Stevens’s view, 100,000 valves could not 
reach California without the sort of intentional efforts her opinion 
described.45 
The big news from Asahi was that the Court found unanimously that 
California lacked jurisdiction. Eight of the justices concluded that 
jurisdiction was “unreasonable” on general grounds, regardless of minimum 
contacts.46 Justice Scalia did not join this rationale and rested his “no 
jurisdiction” vote solely on Justice O’Connor’s analysis as to the stream of 
commerce.47 Picking up on a five-factor test, which first appeared in World-
Wide, the Court evaluated considerations such as the burdens on the parties 
and the forum state’s interest in hearing the dispute; both O’Connor and 
Brennan agreed that Asahi was an unusual case that the California courts 
ought not referee.48 One of the factors mentioned by O’Connor was that 
Asahi, as a foreign defendant, was subject to a special burden as a litigant in 
U.S. court.49 While some lower courts have since recognized this factor in 
denying jurisdiction, it remains debatable whether foreign defendants should 
be advantaged solely because they are foreign.50 
 
 42.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 43.  Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 44.  See id. at 120 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 45.  See id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 46.  Id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 47.  Id. at 104 (Court syllabus). 
 48.  See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 49.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 50.  PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 420 (5th 
ed. 2010) (hereinafter HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES). 
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Probably the most important aspect of Asahi was its unusual posture by 
the time it reached the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in the underlying tort 
case never sued Asahi, but sued only the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, 
and the parties had settled by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.51 
As a result, all that remained of the case was a battle between two foreign 
parties as to the fraction each owed of the settlement. As a result, California 
and the tort plaintiffs were disinterested in the matter,52 all of which was 
enough to release the remaining parties to another forum, presumably in 
Japan or Taiwan. 
After Asahi, predictable confusion reigned among lower courts as to 
which version of the stream-of-commerce test to apply—Justice O’Connor’s 
or Justice Brennan’s.53 Courts divided as to which to follow, and others 
hedged their bets by concluding that the result would be the same under 
either test.54 When the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,55 it seemed likely to resolve the ongoing 
confusion over the stream-of-commerce test. The Court did no such thing. 
The facts in J. McIntyre were straightforward. The defendant was an 
English manufacturer (hereinafter “J. McIntyre”) of scrap metal recycling 
machines.56 One such machine was sold to a New Jersey company through 
J. McIntyre’s nominally independent—though similarly named—Ohio-
based distributor.57 Mr. Nicastro, a resident of New Jersey had four fingers 
cut off of one hand by a machine while on the job with J. McIntyre.58 
Claiming that the machine was unreasonably unsafe, Nicastro brought suit 
against the English manufacturer, and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
jurisdiction, expressly following Brennan’s version of the stream-of-
commerce test.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court once again failed to generate a majority 
opinion. Justice Kennedy’s four-vote plurality opinion questioned the utility 
of the stream-of-commerce metaphor.60 But to the extent that he had a 
preference as between the O’Connor and Brennan versions, it clearly was for 
O’Connor’s as the plurality concluded that the failure of the defendant to 
 
 51.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 50, at 419. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 56.  Id. at 878. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59.  Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., 987 A.2d 575, 589 (N.J. 2008) (rev’d J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)). 
 60.  Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 881. 
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specifically target the state of New Jersey was fatal to the plaintiff’s attempt 
to exercise personal jurisdiction.61 Making the plurality opinion even more 
opaque, it attempted to resurrect World-Wide’s sovereignty theme,62 which 
the Court appeared to discard shortly after World-Wide was decided.63 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent hit the plurality right between the eyes. She 
pointed out that the English defendant was trying to serve the entire U.S. 
market, so the notion that jurisdiction should depend on targeting any 
particular U.S. state was faintly absurd.64 She pointed out that New Jersey 
led the nation in scrap metal recycling, so the sale of a machine in New Jersey 
hardly could come as a shock to the defendant.65 As to the sovereignty 
rationale, Ginsburg noted that there was no competition between the states 
for jurisdiction as there arguably was in World-Wide.66 Moreover, the 
English company could hardly be surprised by an assertion of jurisdiction, 
as the Brussels I Regulation—which governs jurisdiction in the European 
Union—allows for tort jurisdiction at the place of the plaintiff’s injury.67 The 
bitter irony for Mr. Nicastro is that if New Jersey were part of the European 
Union, as opposed to the United States, his case would likely have 
proceeded. 
If the whole dreary mess that was the J. McIntyre case has a hero, it is 
Justice Breyer. Although this is purely speculation, I think it likely that he 
would have preferred to sign Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Instead, he wrote a 
concurrence in the judgment that he persuaded Justice Alito to sign.68 Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence deprived the lead opinion of a fifth vote and ultimately 
became the controlling opinion, as the narrowest opinion capable of 
sustaining the result.69 
Narrow indeed was Justice Breyer’s opinion. He emphasized that the 
record established that only one of the defendant’s machines had ever been 
sold in New Jersey.70 As such, Breyer reasoned that a claim for jurisdiction 
would fail under either of the tests proposed by Brennan and O’Connor.71 In 
 
 61.  Id. at 877. 
 62.  Id. at 874. 
 63.  See Ins. Co. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) 
(distinguishing World-Wide Volkswagen). 
 64.  Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 893–94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id. at 905. 
 66.  Id. at 898 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 444 U.S. at 297 (1980)). 
 67.  Id. at 909 (referring to Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation). 
 68.  Id. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 69.  Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 
5 (2014) (hereinafter Borchers, Twilight). 
 70.  Id. at 5 (discussing Justice Breyer’s opinion). 
 71.  Id. 
BORCHERS - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2017  10:06 AM 
2017] AN “INTERNATIONAL” RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN TORT AND CONTRACT 469 
Breyer’s words, a single drop could not fill the streambed of commerce. He 
also reserved for another day the question of jurisdiction if the product were 
marketed through a large virtual reseller such as Amazon.com.72 
It is difficult to think of the lack of a majority opinion—as so often 
happens in U.S. Supreme Court conflicts decisions73—as good news. 
However, as I and others have pointed out, had J. McIntyre’s plurality 
opinion been a majority opinion, it would have rolled back the jurisdictional 
clock many decades.74 Still there was bad news aplenty. First, Mr. Nicastro 
was denied any rational forum, and future, similarly-situated plaintiffs will 
likely face the same result. Second, the split as to the appropriate stream-of-
commerce test remains no closer to resolution. Third, the status of the 
reasonableness test deployed in Asahi remains a mystery; it was not 
mentioned in any of the J. McIntyre opinions. In a later general jurisdiction 
case,75 Justice Sotomayor, in concurrence, indicated she would have used the 
Asahi test to deny jurisdiction,76 but Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
opined that it only applied in specific jurisdiction cases.77 If this is so, it is 
hard to explain why the test made no appearance in J. McIntyre, particularly 
in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. 
2. Intentional Torts 
Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence in 
intentional torts seemed to make more sense than the stream-of-commerce 
cases. In companion multistate defamation cases, the Court ruled that 
plaintiffs could obtain jurisdiction in any place in which the offending 
publication had substantial circulation. 
The less-remembered of the two cases is Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc.78 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Hustler magazine libeled her79 
and she filed suit in a New Hampshire state court. The plaintiff’s choice of 
jurisdiction amounted to unabashed forum shopping. Although she had no 
connection to New Hampshire,80 the state was apparently the only forum in 
which the statute of limitations had not run. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
 
 72.  Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 73.  See generally, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 74.  See, e.g., Borchers, Twilight, supra note 69, at 4. 
 75.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 76.  Id. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 77.  Id. at 762 n.20. 
 78.  465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 79.  Id. at 772. 
 80.  Id. at 779. 
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ruled that the circulation of approximately 15,000 of the defendant’s 
magazines in New Hampshire established minimum contacts.81 
The better-remembered case is Calder v. Jones.82 In that case, the 
California-domiciled actress Shirley Jones alleged that a National Enquirer 
article libeled her.83 Apparently, nobody disputed that the National Enquirer, 
with a massive California circulation, was subject to jurisdiction in Jones’s 
suit in California.84 The more challenging issue was whether the author and 
editor of the article in question—both with limited connections to the forum 
state of California—should be subject to jurisdiction there. The Supreme 
Court ruled in the affirmative and in so doing launched the Calder “effects” 
test.85 Under the effects test, the majority reasoned that the predictable effect 
on Jones’s reputation in her home state of California rendered the defendants 
amenable to jurisdiction there.86 
In an age of digital communications, lower courts have struggled with 
the implications of Calder and Keeton—cases that pre-dated the emergence 
of “Internet” as a household word.87 Nowhere has this been truer than in 
Internet libel.88 The logic of Keeton would appear to require jurisdiction 
anywhere an allegedly libelous article can be read online; essentially any 
location with unfiltered Internet access.89 Kathy Keeton had no connection 
to—and no reason to file suit in—New Hampshire other than its status as the 
one state in which the statutory limitation period had not expired.90 Lower 
courts, however, have mostly ignored Keeton and concentrated on Calder 
and the federal district court case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot 
Com, Inc.91 Now nearly two decades old, the Zippo test—which focuses on 
the interactivity of a website—is obsolete, because almost any webpage 
today falls on the high end of the interactivity scale.92 
 
 81.  Id. at 780. 
 82.  465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 83.  Id. at 784. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 789. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See generally, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (in which a Cornell 
graduate student was charged criminally for launching the first Internet virus (technically a “worm”)). 
 88.  Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Personal 
Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473 (2004) (hereinafter Borchers, Internet Libel). 
 89.  Id. at 480. 
 90.  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). 
 91.  952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 92.  See Emily Ekland, Scaling Back Zippo: The Downside to the Zippo Sliding Scale and Proposed 
Alternatives to its Uses, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 380, 384 (2012). 
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The Calder “effects” test, by contrast, is gaining influence as more 
courts find it attractive in Internet cases.93 Cases relying on the effects test 
ask whether the communication or other Internet activity specifically 
targeted the forum in question, either by discussing persons well-known in 
the state or mentioning activities taking place in the forum state.94 While one 
can perhaps understand the desire to ignore Keeton and its implicit allowance 
of jurisdiction in virtually any state,95 it has never been overruled. Better 
devices to avoid obvious forum shopping are venue transfer96 and forum non 
conveniens.97 
All of which brings us to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Walden 
v. Fiore.98 Walden is an odd case. The plaintiffs in the underlying suit were 
two Nevada professional gamblers. On their return from Puerto Rico, they 
had $97,000 in cash seized in the Atlanta, Georgia airport by an agent of the 
federal government who suspected that it might be drug money.99 The 
plaintiffs filed a Bivens100 action in a Nevada federal court against the agent 
on the equivalent of a trespass to chattels theory; it had been several months 
before the plaintiffs’ seized belongings were returned.101 The plaintiffs’ most 
significant allegation was that the federal agent, acting in Georgia, had 
helped draft a false “probable cause” affidavit to allow forfeiture of the 
money.102 
The Ninth Circuit held that there was jurisdiction under Calder’s effects 
test.103 However, on appeal the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a sentence 
that will likely be quoted in thousands of briefs, the Court held that the 
defendant’s “actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with 
Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom 
he knew had Nevada connections.”104 The Court appeared to draw a 
distinction between contacts with state residents and contacts with the state. 
 
 93.  See, e.g., Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2016); Guffey v. Ostonakulov, 
321 P.3d 971 (Okla. 2014); Abdouch v. Lopez, 829 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 2013); Snowney v. Harrah’s 
Entm’t, Inc., 112 P.3d 28 (Cal. 2005). 
 94.  See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389 (Mo. App. 2010); Dailey v. Popma, 191 
N.C. App. 64 (2008); Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 
527 (Minn. 2002). 
 95.  See Borchers, Internet Libel, supra note 88, at 465–66. 
 96.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 
 97.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).  
 98.  134 S. Ct. 1115 (2013). 
 99.  Id. at 1119. 
 100.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 101.  Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2013). 
 104.  Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. 
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But, of course, human activity is more significant when it affects other 
humans, and residence is as powerful a connection as a person can have with 
a state. 
Perhaps the case was best litigated in Georgia—where the allegedly 
tortious actions occurred.105 But that is what forum non conveniens and the 
transfer statutes are for. If the bulk of the evidence is in another forum, 
dismissal on venue—not jurisdictional—grounds is called for.106 
3. General Jurisdiction 
Much has been written about the U.S. Supreme Court’s two new general 
jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction based upon unrelated contacts or, “all 
purpose jurisdiction,” a term coined by Justice Ginsburg) cases: Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown107 and Daimler AG v. Bauman.108 
Both cases were simple in the sense that neither involved a connection to the 
forum that would sustain jurisdiction under any mainstream theory. But both 
cases, per opinions by Justice Ginsburg, made clear that the scope of general 
jurisdiction is considerably smaller than previously thought.109 
International Shoe had stated previously that “continuous and 
systematic” contacts unrelated to a given cause of action may be sufficient 
to support jurisdiction.110 Moreover, International Shoe implied that the facts 
in that case—in which the contacts were about $30,000 worth of shoe sales 
in the forum—constituted “continuous and systematic” activity in the 
forum.111 
Beyond that, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke only twice about general 
jurisdiction until Goodyear was decided in 2011. The Court regularly cites 
Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co.112 for the proposition that a forum state has 
general jurisdiction over a corporation if its principal place of business is in 
the forum state;113 though as I have argued elsewhere, the case is not really 
so neat and clean.114 In the 1980’s, the Court held in another case that four 
million dollars worth of unrelated purchases in the forum state did not sustain 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.115 Thus, the high Court’s “guidance” 
 
 105.  Id. at 1119. 
 106.  See generally, e.g., Gilbert v. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 107.  564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 108.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 109.  See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920; see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 110.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
 111.  Id. at 320. 
 112.  342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 113.  See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 928. 
 114.  Borchers, Twilight, supra note 69, at 6 n.42. 
 115.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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to lower courts was that maintaining corporate headquarters in the forum 
state suffices for general jurisdiction, but unrelated purchases do not; in 
between those poles, do your best. 
With such faint path markers, it is hardly surprising that lower courts 
varied widely in setting a threshold for sufficient contacts to establish general 
jurisdiction.116 The Goodyear case involved the failure of a tire manufactured 
by a subsidiary of the U.S. tire company, which allegedly caused an accident 
in Paris that took the lives of two North Carolina boys.117 Their survivors 
brought suit in North Carolina state court. The North Carolina courts upheld 
jurisdiction in a muddled opinion by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
which confused the specific jurisdiction “stream of commerce” doctrine with 
general jurisdiction concepts.118 
Unsurprisingly, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that there was 
no jurisdiction. But what was a bit surprising is that the Court attempted to 
set forth a test for general jurisdiction over corporations. Analogizing to an 
individual’s domicile, the Court ruled that the corporation must be “at 
home,” and identified a corporation’s principal place of business and state of 
incorporation as being paradigmatic examples of “home.”119 Elsewhere in 
the opinion, the Court added the qualifier “essentially” to the “at home” 
test.120 
Considerable debate took place after Goodyear as to whether corporate 
general jurisdiction could ever be exercised outside of the states of a 
corporation’s principal place of business and incorporation.121 But this 
debate seems settled beyond rational controversy by Daimler.122 In that case, 
a unanimous Court (with Justice Sotomayor concurring only in the 
judgment) accepted as truth a set of remarkable propositions. The case was 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute123 alleging that Daimler AG (the parent 
corporation for the makers of Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz car models) 
collaborated with the Argentinian government in the “Dirty War” of the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s ultimately to harm the plaintiffs and their 
 
 116.  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 50, at 411. 
 117.  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. 
 118.  Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. App. 2009), rev’d Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 119.  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. 
 120.  Id. at 919. 
 121.  See generally, e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 999 (2012). 
 122.  See Daimler 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.19 (2014) (purporting not to “foreclose the possibility that in 
an exceptional case” general jurisdiction may exist beyond a corporation’s principal place of business 
and state of incorporation). 
 123.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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families.124 First, the Court bypassed the obvious fact that claims under the 
Alien Tort Statute had been held to apply only to torts committed in the 
United States; thus no claim had been stated.125 Then the Court credited the 
plaintiffs’ assertion that Daimler’s indirect subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA 
(“MBUSA”), should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional 
purposes; thus attributing its contacts with the forum state of California to 
Daimler.126 With no whiff of a suggestion that Daimler had ignored corporate 
formalities or that its indirect subsidiary was under-capitalized, the Court 
was skeptical of the plaintiffs’ position but accepted it arguendo.127 
The Supreme Court wanted to make a point about general jurisdiction. 
MBUSA had considerable contacts with California because a substantial 
fraction of its sales took place there128 and it had showrooms and offices 
aplenty in the forum state.129 But the problem, said the Court per Justice 
Ginsburg, was that even attributing MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler, the 
contacts were nowhere near sufficient to make California Daimler’s 
“home.”130 
A perplexed Justice Sotomayor concurred only in the judgment.131 She 
recounted MBUSA’s extensive contacts with California and noted the 
majority’s willingness to attribute them to Daimler.132 But, as she noted, the 
majority held that Daimler’s far-flung operations kept California from being 
its home, no matter how substantial its California operations might have been 
in an absolute sense.133 As Justice Sotomayor stated: “The problem, the 
Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, but 
that its contacts with other forums are too many.”134 
It is hard to resist the force of Justice Sotomayor’s critique. If one were 
drawing up a jurisdictional statute, it might make sense to limit jurisdiction 
based upon unrelated contacts to a corporation’s home, as does the Brussels 
I Regulation. But if one returns to the basic fairness rationale of International 
Shoe, it’s hard to fathom how the presence of contacts in other forums makes 
 
 124.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 125.  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1669 (2013) (holding that the Alien 
Tort Claims Act presumptively lacks extraterritorial application).  
 126.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 127.  Id. at 752. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 764. 
 130.  Id. at 760. 
 131.  Id. at 763. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 764. 
 134.  Id. 
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it any more or less difficult to defend in a forum with which the defendant 
has considerable contacts.135 
So in one sense, tort conflicts have been internationalized, albeit not in 
a way I consider useful or just. Every time the Court has been asked to assert 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant—in Asahi, Helicopteros, Goodyear, J. 
McIntyre and Daimler—it has refused. While this does not amount to a rule 
that international defendants are immune from long-arm jurisdiction, the 
Court’s trend is hard to ignore. 
B. Contracts 
The minimum contacts test is of little practical relevance with regard to 
forum choice in contract matters. In the only two contract jurisdiction cases 
to reach the Supreme Court since International Shoe—McGee v. 
International Life Insurance Co.136 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz137—
the Court has held that a plaintiff who is a party to the contract at issue may 
sue in the plaintiff’s home state.138 The only real news out of these cases is 
that the Supreme Court appeared uninterested in protecting the weaker party 
to the transaction, as do many E.U. regulations. Although the Court in 
McGee protected the weaker party, an insurance policyholder, the Court in 
Burger King sided with the giant franchisor over one of its franchisees. 
All of this is of diminishing relevance. In Carnival Cruise Lines v. 
Shute139 the Supreme Court enforced against a cruise passenger an exclusive 
choice-of-forum clause on the back of a ticket.140 The only permissible forum 
was Florida (the cruise line’s base of operations), even though the plaintiffs 
were from Washington state and the cruise departed out of California.141 
Although Carnival was an admiralty case and thus not binding on state 
courts, the vast majority of state courts have followed it.142 
Of more importance, however, is a series of pro-arbitration rulings from 
the Supreme Court starting with AT&T v. Concepcion.143 In Concepcion, the 
Court kicked off a series of opinions ruling that arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts are enforceable, making any practical relief in small 
claims matters practically unattainable because of the inability to stage a 
 
 135.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
 136.  355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 137.  471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 138.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–80; McGee, 355 U.S. at. 223. 
 139.  499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 140.  Id. at 588–89. 
 141.  Id. at 594–95. 
 142.  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 50, at 544. 
 143.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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class action suit or class-wide arbitration.144 A study by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau found in 2015 that over half of all credit card 
debt is covered by arbitration agreements;145 this figure will only increase as 
businesses recognize the advantage such agreements give them, and only 
legislative or regulatory action will stand capable of stemming the tide. 
Of course, forum-selection clauses, arbitration clauses and choice-of-
law clauses have their place, particularly in business-to-business 
transactions. In The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,146 the Supreme Court 
upheld a choice-of-forum clause between a United States company and a 
German company that selected the English Courts in an admiralty dispute. 
Because of widespread acceptance of the New York Convention, arbitration 
awards in business disputes are considerably easier to enforce than are U.S. 
court judgments.147 
The Second Preliminary Draft of the Third Restatement does not yet 
include any draft contract rules. The only black letter rule of relevance on 
choice of law is Section 1.04, which states that “it remains possible that 
factors in a particular international case will call for a result different from 
that which would be reached in an interstate case.”148 The commentary notes 
correctly that, for the most part, courts and commentators have not 
distinguished between interstate and international cases, though it notes a 
few counter-examples. 
The reality is that contract conflicts are about as internationalized in the 
United States as they are likely to get. The widespread enforcement of 
arbitration, choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses and the United States 
being a signatory to the major arbitration conventions has made the law of 
contracts conflicts relatively international by modest United States 
standards. Of course, there may be good policy reasons for adopting some 
international concepts such as protection of the weaker party, but as 
illustrated by the failed effort to import a mild consumer preference into the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the United States has gone as far as it’s likely to 
go in the near future. It seems unlikely that anything with a fair claim to 
being a Restatement can do more. 
 
 144.  Rachael Kent & Marik String, Availability of Class Arbitration Under US Law, 18 ICCA 
CONGRESS SERIES 853, 856 (2015). 
 145.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 2015, at 
9, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015/. 
 146.  407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 147.  W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11, n.60 (2009). 
 148.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.04 (Prelim. Draft 
No. 2, 2016) [hereinafter SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT]. 
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II. CHOICE OF LAW 
Here I confine myself mostly to tort choice-of-law concepts. As 
discussed above, the Second Preliminary Draft of the Third Restatement does 
not yet include contract choice-of-law provisions; in any event, contract 
choice of law has been taken over to a large extent by the expansion (perhaps 
over-expansion) of party autonomy. 
Tort choice of law is a different ball of wax. Although the Second 
Preliminary Draft acknowledges in Section 6.08 the possibility of a post-tort 
agreement to the applicable law (which may happen occasionally but surely 
rarely except by default in cases where neither party raises the choice-of-law 
issue) and contract-related torts covered by expansive choice-of-law 
clauses,149 party autonomy plays a much-reduced role in torts. 
The Second Preliminary Draft of the Third Restatement, however, is 
appropriately international in several respects. First, it is a vast improvement 
from the Second Restatement in terms of predictability. One of the reasons 
that the American Conflicts Revolution never fully took hold outside the 
United States—including and especially in Europe—is that other nations 
were wary of its free-form analysis and inability to predict results because of 
the wildly varying nature of what counted as interest.150 The Second 
Preliminary Draft seeks to remedy this by recognizing the difference 
between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules,151 as well as laying 
down some reasonably concrete rules152 without the endless qualification of 
the Second Restatement that Section 6 could override its presumptive rules. 
The Second Preliminary Draft also moves toward international 
harmonization and predictability by choosing the law of the place of the 
injury in most cases involving a conflict of loss-allocating tort rules, unless 
the parties have a common geographical location such as a shared domicile 
or principal place of business.153 This “common domicile” rule is one of the 
few unquestioned improvements generated by the American conflicts 
revolution and is widely shared around the world.154 
 
 149.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, § 6.08(2). 
 150.  See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TULANE L. REV. 
1607, 1610–11 (2008). 
 151.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, §§ 6.01, 6.04. 
 152.  See SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, §§ 6.02–6.04. 
 153.  Id. §§ 6.02, 6.03. 
 154.  See, e.g., Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2) O.J. (L 199) (EC) (common habitual 
residence); Erie v. Edwards Coach Lines, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (N.Y. 2011) (common domicile); 
Patrick J. Borchers, Nebraska Choice of Law: A Synthesis, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) 
[hereinafter Borchers, Synthesis] (common domicile or principal place of business). 
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From the standpoint of interactions between persons (including 
businesses) in the United States with those outside the United States, it is 
difficult to imagine a more valuable consideration than predictability of 
result. Litigation in the United States is expensive for many reasons. In 
general, fees are not shifted to the losing party.155 Uncertainty of the result 
as to a choice-of-law issue is a perpetual “joker in the deck” that generates 
appeals and frustrates settlements in lawsuits.156 Extensive pre-trial 
discovery and scads of other factors add to the list. Although from the outside 
the entire United States may appear a tort plaintiff’s nirvana, states vary 
considerably in their treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. For example, my 
home state of Nebraska does not allow punitive damages,157 and jury verdicts 
are low by national standards.158 There is a huge difference between trying a 
case tried in Omaha under Nebraska law and in Los Angeles under California 
law.159 
The current draft (and its predictability) could be improved in several 
ways. I am not in favor of Section 6.03(2). In cases involving loss-allocating 
rules in which the conduct and subsequent injury take place in different states 
(as is common in products liability cases), the draft section defaults to the 
law of the state of the conduct.160 This default choice can be rebutted only if 
the plaintiff is affiliated with the injury state, the injury in the state is 
“objectively foreseeable,” and the plaintiff requests application of the injury 
state’s law. I can see nothing in the interests of predictability or fairness 
served by such a rule. Moreover, I am unable to locate any substantial 
support for such a rule in the case law. So to the extent that this is to be a 
restatement, I am unclear as to what is being restated. 
Several practical problems are also apparent. The most fundamental is 
that because the law of the state of the conduct will often apply in products 
cases, states may engage in a race to the bottom with regard to product 
liability law in an effort to attract manufacturing jobs. A state that completely 
abolished liability for defective products would surely become a prime 
 
 155.  See generally Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796) (counsel fees are not allowed as 
damages). 
 156.  See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 
169 (2001). 
 157.  See, e.g., Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975) (“The defendants further 
alleged the judgments were repugnant to the laws of Nebraska because they included punitive damages 
in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of Nebraska.”). 
 158.  U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2015 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY 1 (2015), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ILR15077-HarrisReport_BF2.pdf(concluding 
Nebraska has third best liability regime for business defendants). 
 159.  Id. (ranking California 47th). 
 160.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, § 6.03(2). 
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location for a company relocating its manufacturing plants and design 
headquarters. I am also leery of the phrase “objectively foreseeable,” though 
I know that it is used in the Oregon conflicts codification.161 I am unsure 
what the word “objectively” does to modify foreseeability, itself an objective 
concept. If any modifier should be used, I would suggest “reasonably.” 
Moreover, I worry that courts will take their cue from the Supreme Court’s 
plurality opinion in J. McIntyre162 and apply absurdly cramped notions of 
what constitutes foreseeability, leading courts to require “targeting” of a state 
to fulfill this provision. 
Moreover, I do not see why it should make a difference whether a 
plaintiff is geographically affiliated with the injury state. Assuming the issue 
is one of loss allocation, one can imagine a car manufactured in a haven state 
with very restrictive laws on products liability. The plaintiff purchases the 
car in Wisconsin (which has reasonable laws on products liability) and drives 
into Illinois (another state with reasonable laws on products liability but with 
which the plaintiff has no other connection) and shortly after crossing into 
Illinois is involved in an accident in which the plaintiff is badly burned by a 
fuel pump with a manufacturing defect.163 Had the plaintiff been involved in 
a collision in Wisconsin, she likely could have received the benefit of 
Wisconsin law. But by having crossed into Illinois, she is now relegated to 
the haven state’s product liability law. Why? This situation brings to mind 
the Supreme Court’s willful blindness in World-Wide Volkswagen to the fact 
that cars (and many other products) are intended to be mobile. To give the 
manufacturer a choice-of-law bonus for having its product used as intended 
seems random and unfair. I suggest that the law of the injury state, not the 
conduct state, become the default rule; this will avoid a state-by-state race-
to-the-bottom problem. 
Section 6.03 could also stand clarification regarding dépeçage. This 
issue arose in Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co.,164 which involved many 
parties related to a horrific vehicle accident in New York. A majority on the 
New York Court of Appeals took, in my view, the appropriate route of lining 
up the various conflicts party-by-party and applying the appropriate law.165 
The dissent and the lower New York courts proposed taking an “overall” 
approach to the case and applying one law to the entire controversy.166 Had 
the dissenting view prevailed, there would be few modern cases falling into 
 
 161.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 15.440(3)(c)(A). 
 162.  J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).  
 163.  See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 164.  952 N.E.2d 1033 (N.Y. 2011). 
 165.  Id. at 1042. 
 166.  Id. 
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the “common affiliation” definition given the common complexity of 
modern tort litigation. Thus, I argue Section 6.03 should in its black letter (at 
a minimum its commentary) side with the Edwards majority. 
To return to the conduct-regulation versus loss-allocating distinction, 
the divide has been recognized in U.S. codifications,167 European 
regulations,168 U.S. case law,169 and by various commentators.170 The Second 
Preliminary Draft of the Third Restatement puts more into the conduct-
regulating basket than I think belongs there. For example, it places “strict 
liability” and “duty owed to the plaintiff” in the conduct-regulating basket,171 
but “guest statutes” in the loss-allocating basket172 even though the few 
remaining enforceable guest statutes simply alter the duty of care owed to 
the guest-plaintiff.173 So I am puzzled as to why rules imposing a duty toward 
plaintiffs should be treated as conduct-regulating in one setting but not 
another. Rules that are meant to (and likely do) have a direct impact on 
primary conduct (say speed limits) are obviously conduct-regulating.174 So, 
too, in my view are detailed safety standards175 and punitive damages.176 
Beyond that, I would not go far in categorizing specific rules as conduct-
regulating. However, assuming that the rule is truly conduct-regulating, the 
Second Preliminary Draft makes the right choice in choosing the law of the 
place of the conduct.177 
I am particularly concerned regarding strict liability’s inclusion in the 
conduct-regulating basket. To return to my fuel pump hypothetical, suppose 
a haven state imposes strict products liability but limits recovery to $25,000 
per incident all in an effort to draw manufacturing and product design jobs 
to its state. If the car were designed and manufactured in this haven state, 
liability would be confined to $25,000 per incident, regardless of where the 
car were bought and used, because the Second Preliminary Draft chooses the 
state of manufacture and design as the site of the relevant conduct. 
 
 167.  See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 3543. 
 168.  See Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 17, O.J. (L 199) (EC)  (referring to rules of conduct 
and safety in non-contractual obligations). 
 169.  See, e.g., Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 64 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994). 
 170.  See generally, e.g., Borchers, Synthesis, supra note 154, at 7; John T. Cross, The Conduct-
Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice of Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425 (2003). 
 171.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, § 6.04. 
 172.  Id. § 6.01. 
 173.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-1-2 (requiring a showing of “willful or wanton misconduct” by host 
in order for guest to recover). 
 174.  See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). 
 175.  See, e.g., Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994). 
 176.  Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping and the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 529, 545 (2010). 
 177.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, §§ 6.04, 6.05. 
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Conduct-regulating rules should include only those that have a direct 
impact on primary behavior, not secondary behavior such as buying 
insurance. Acts that require intentional (or at least reckless) disregard for 
legal rules belong in the conduct-regulating basket. But rules such as 
negligence and strict liability, which operate in the background, do not. I 
suspect most adults have an innate sense that they should behave carefully, 
but recognize that they do not always live up to this standard; this is why we 
buy insurance (and often are required to do so). In general, tort rules that do 
not require recklessly or intentionally tortious conduct belong in the loss-
allocating basket. 
In an effort to promote internationalization, the Second Tentative Draft, 
though not embracing “habitual residence” as a full substitute for domicile, 
bravely attempts to define this notoriously malleable concept.178 From the 
standpoint of internationalization, this is an important development because 
it appears now in so many international conventions to which the United 
States is a party.179 
I suppose no conflicts codification or restatement would be complete 
without a “safety valve.” One of my criticisms of the Second Restatement is 
that it leads with giant safety valves in Sections 6, 144 and 188, thus 
obscuring the view of its presumptive rules.180 Recently, some courts have 
recognized my point and began looking to the Second Restatement’s 
presumptive rules rather than trying to work every case out anew from an 
unwieldy list of considerations often pointing in different directions.181 
At least in the tort section, the safety valve is in the right place—at the 
end rather than the beginning.182 But it needs some work. It states that it 
applies to tort “choice-of-law questions not explicitly provided for in this 
Restatement . . . .”183 However, presumably the universe of tort issues is 
entirely occupied by loss-allocating and conduct-regulating rules. I fear that 
courts will read “explicitly” to mean any tort issue not mentioned in the non-
exhaustive lists of loss-allocating and conduct-regulating rules. A better 
approach, and one that would more appropriately internationalizes the Third 
Restatement, would be to say that application of the tort provisions could be 
overridden if they would lead to “a manifestly unfair result that a party could 
 
 178.  Id. § 2.04. 
 179.  See, e.g., Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 U.S. 1224, 1228 (2014) (applying “habitual 
residence” test under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction). 
 180.  See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some 
Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232 (1997). 
 181.  See, e.g., P.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 459 (N.J. 2008); Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 900 (Ill. 2007). 
 182.  SECOND PRELIM. DRAFT, supra note 148, § 6.07. 
 183.  Id. 
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not have foreseen;” thus giving courts latitude to depart from the principles 
set forth in the tort section, particularly in international cases. In the 
commentary and the illustrations, it could be made clear that this is more 
likely to occur in international cases in which a party has little reason to think 
that the law of a U.S. state will apply and it would work a manifest injustice 
on that party. 
CONCLUSION 
My optimism is buoyed regarding the future of our discipline here in 
the United States. Distinguished judges184 and Supreme Court Justices185 
have chastised American conflicts academics for having made the discipline 
incomprehensible. Fair enough. I am an accessory, as early in my career I 
focused heavily on the matter of individual justice to the parties and little on 
the systemic value of predictability, both in terms of judicial stability and the 
ability of parties to settle cases on reasonable terms. In mitigation, I plead 
that I defended the Louisiana codification largely on the ground that it had 
consolidated the gains of the American Conflicts Revolution (particularly 
the common domicile rule) while providing a common vocabulary that 
would allow trial courts to reach results that appellate courts would affirm. 
My empirical work showed that the Louisiana codification achieved this 
result by drastically reducing the reversal rate of trial courts.186 I am now a 
convert—the Restatement needs reasonable predictability. 
I do not believe, however, that predictability is or should be the only 
goal of conflicts law. Choosing forum law in every case would be perfectly 
predictable, but would reward forum shopping and could burden a party 
(likely the defendant) with the application of an unforeseeable rule. 
However, we have before us the chance of a generation to restate something. 
When comparativists such as Professor Reimann complain justifiably about 
the Second Restatement’s lack of internationalization, they appear to offer 
two major points; one express and the other half-buried. The express point 
was the undisputed unpredictability of the result generated by the Second 
 
 184.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 430 (1990) (noting “the destruction 
of certainty in the field of conflict of laws as a result of the replacement of the mechanical common law 
rules by ‘interest analysis’”). 
 185.  See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“one is faced with 
the prospect that federal punitive damages law (the new field created by today’s decision) will be beset 
by the sort of ‘interest analysis’ that has laid waste the formerly comprehensible field of conflict of 
laws.”). 
 186.  See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana’s Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical 
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 LA. L. REV. 1061 (2000) 
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Restatement, interest analysis and the “mishmash”187 of modern American 
decisions. Point taken. A Third Restatement has the opportunity to, and 
likely will, address this matter. 
The other, half-buried, point is tort judgments considered exorbitant by 
foreign parties. Here, the Supreme Court has come to the rescue of foreign 
parties by consistently refusing to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over them. 
Realistically, there is little the Third Restatement can do on this matter. 
While the Supreme Court continues in its possibly mistaken188 view that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets physical boundaries 
on the exercise of U.S. state-court jurisdiction, there is little the drafters of 
the Third Restatement can do short of getting themselves appointed to the 
Supreme Court. While it is of little comfort to Mr. Nicastro, surely the 
English manufacturer of the allegedly defective machine can do little to 
complain. The most certain route to avoiding American courts is not to sell 
in the American market. With the reward so should come the risk. But in any 
event, the Third Restatement thus far holds promise for major progress. 
 
 
 187.  William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 
MERCER L. REV. 645, 653 (1983). 
 188.  See Patrick J. Borchers, From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
19, 43–49 (1990). 
